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Introduction
T H I S P A P E R examines the relationship between religion, ethnicity
and politics in Cyprus during the Turkocratia (1571-1878), the period
of Ottoman rule. Its major thesis is that in the pre-industrial frame-
work of Ottoman rule in Cyprus neither religion nor ethnicity were
major sources of conflict in a society composed of two ethnic groups
(Greeks and Turks) and following two monotheistic faiths (Christian-
ity and Islam) in marked contrast to the recent history of Cyprus.
In broad outline it closely parallels Gellner's thesis (1983) that nation-
alism is a by-product of industrialization, extensive education lit-
eracy and geographical and social mobility, and it seeks to show that
the major cleavages in Cyprus were mainly intraethnic rather than
interethnic.
This article seeks to go beyond this viewpoint, however, in two
significant aspects. It shows that in pre-industrial, agrarian, pre-
national polities more attention must be given first to the political
economy of interstitial institutions such as the Church in the case
of Christianity (or the clerisy in Islam), and second to the way religion
and intermarriage, including the complementarity of different prop-
erty transmission systems, regulate relations between groups.
In his work on nationalism Gellner has noted that in agro-literate
societies 'the only stratum wich can in any sense be said to have a
cultural policy is the clerisy. Sometimes [...] its policy is in effect
to create a complementarity and mutual interdependence between
itself and the other orders. It seeks to strengthen its own position
by making itself indispensable, and the complementary roles it
ascribes to itself and to the laity, far from requiring its own univer-
salization, formally preclude it' (1983 : 16).
A major feature of Ottoman rule was its reliance on local power
structures, such as the Orthodox Church, to collect taxes on its
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behalf and function as a counterweight to the muhassil (Governor),
the Porte's representative. The Church was thus a partner of the
Turkish rulers, mediating between them and the peasantry, whom
it quite often oppressed by virtue of this role. In the traditional
situation this did not lead to conflict between the two religions or
ethnic groupes qua groups, although other cleavages were certainly
present. More importantly the intimate involvement of the Ortho-
dox Church in the administration of the island had profound effects
on Cyprus political economy and ultimately on the progress of
Greek nationalism. Various observers (e.g. Clogg 1976, 1982) have
noted that the Church certainly benefited from this accommodation.
Yet the impression is one of venality which is certainly important
in explaining cleavages in Greek society, but bypasses the significant
economic effects in the countryside. The large church estates which
dotted the Cypriot countryside during the Turkocratia were a direct
effect of the development of export oriented agriculture and of the
privileged political position of the church enshrined in the millet
administrative system.
In Cyprus, as in other parts of South Eastern Europe, the benefits
of such indispensability were not totally unequivocal. Apart from
permitting the Greeks to enter trade (which somewhat softened the
harsh realities of Greek low social and legal status), the Ottomans
permitted Greek women to intermarry with them and both men and
women could also convert to Islam. In many cases especially in
the countryside, the Church was unable to patrol its borders effec-
tively and prevent migration from the flock. As in Western Europe
(Goody 1983) peasant matrimonial strategies often conflicted with
official Church dogma, further exacerbating tensions between the
grassroots and the Church hierarchy.
Greek-Ottoman intermarriage of a specific type was also assisted
by the coexistence of different property transmission systems. In
this paper I take the view that in analysing intergroup relations it
is important to move beyond a consideration of their political and
legal frameworks. The way religions define group membership
including the regulation of marriage and the transmission of property,
is equally significant. The essential similarities between Christianity
and Islam should not disguise the fact that they regulate social rela-
tions and marriage differently. In Cyprus, as in other parts of the
Middle East, religious camouflaging enabled subject groups to
migrate from their faith and move upwards, especially when the
ruling group's religion possessed an ascribed legal superiority.
Although the subject Orthodox Church could not patrol its borders
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effectively and was unable to apply spiritual and temporal sanctions
effectively, the specific features of the receiving religion should not
be overlooked. In matrimonial matters, in contrast to Christianity
which insisted on the Orthodoxy of both partners, Islam permitted
Muslim men to take Christian wives, thus offering some degree of
social mobility to subject individuals.
Different systems of property transfers (Christian dowry, Islamic
brideprice) and marriage patterns, themselves codified by religion,
encouraged this one-way upward flow of Greek Orthodox women
into the Islamic ruling group. It thus makes little sense to concen-
trate solely on the formal politico-legal statuses of religions faiths
and their effects on intergroup relations; the way religious regulate
certain basic social institutions such as marriage and the family,
permit or restrict movement from the faith, are equally important.
Although such movement was possible because Christians were a
subject people, Islam was much more elastic in these matters; cross-
cutting ties of ambiguous ethnicity linked the two communities.
Under British rule (1878-1960) relations between the two ethnic
and religious groups changed. The Turks lost their ascribed legal
superiority and became a political minority. Apostasy and/or inter-
marriage, two traditional avenues of social mobility for the Greeks,
which had been ineffectively resisted by the Church, ceased to be
followed; religious boundaries (especially Greek Orthodox) became
more rigid. Cross-cutting ties were discouraged, the Church was
able to patrol its borders more closely and both communities com-
peted for the same state resources. The Greek community under
the political leadership of the Orthodox Church agitated for enosis
(union with Greece), an ideal largely formed through the historical
experiences of the Church under the Turkocratia.
Church and Ottoman administration
Four political and economic effects can be discerned from the
Ottoman occupation of Cyprus: the transformation of the demo-
graphic composition by the introduction of a relatively small Turkish
ruling group (Papadopoulos 1965); the political emergence of the
Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church as an essential part of the Imperial
millet administration both as a tax-collecting agency and political
representative of the Greek rayah (flock); the growth of large monastic
estates and chiftliks, latifundia-type farms producing staples for
European markets; and finally an ethnic division of labour between
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Greeks and Turks, the former entering the illegal trade in staples
in association with European merchant-consuls, whilst the Turks
concentrated on land ownership and administration.
The Ottoman theory of the State, the 'circle of equity' placed
the military at the centre of society. All land and goods belonged
to the Sultan who could dispose of them at will to ensure the well-
being of his subjects. According to the theory without the State
there could be no justice, the promotion of Islam would be leaderless,
subject to the anarchy of tribalism; without justice the subjects could
not prosper (Shaw 1976). The military, essential to maintain the
State and promote justice, had to be maintained through taxes. This
theory clearly excluded 'producers from political participation and
rulers from economic concerns' (Gellner 1981: 75) yet it was to be
transformed in practice. Instead it enabled the 'natural represen-
tatives' of the subject-producers to exercise an essential interstitial
role in government machinery often with a good deal of ambiguity.
Conversely, rulers, far from being excluded from economic concerns,
were involved in financial matters often to the exclusion of matters
of political representation.
Soon after the Ottoman conquest the Orthodox Church was re-
stored its properties which it had lost to the Latin Church during the
Lusignan and Venetian periods (Hill 1952) (1). The classic prebendal
system of ziamet (prebendal) allocation to sipahis was abandoned
and tax-farming established. As Governors lost many of their preb-
endal incomes they 'were placed in the hypocritical position of
finding their own quasi-legal sources of revenue, including the tax-
farming option, and of maintaining the large revenues increasingly
necessary for their own survival' (McGowan 1981: 58). Insecurity
of tenure in Cyprus, as elsewhere in the Ottoman empire, obliged
such men to rely on local groups which possessed the resources,
skills, manpower, status, and knowledge of local affairs necessary to
identify tax-payers and collect revenues on their behalf. The Cypriot
Church filled these conditions admirably. The arrangement was also
encouraged by Constantinople probably for opposite reasons. The
Sublime Porte recognized Churchmen as the natural representatives
of their people not only because of the relatively privileged status of
Christianity as a Religion of the Book in Islam, but also because they
(1) Given the length of the intervening the property previously held by the Latin
period it is certainly questionable whether Church; the claims of continuity with the
the Orthodox Church knew what it had past may well have had nationalist implica-
lost to the Latin Church. It is probable tions, as Gellner (1983) has pointed out.
that the Orthodox Church simply received
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were a useful counterweight to local governors in whose hands were
theoretically centralized all administrative and military matters.
Government through tax-farming was a recognizably risky business
due to its ultimately deleterious effects upon already depleted regions;
if taxes were too harsh the population ceased to cultivate or fled.
A semblance of political representation could be maintained by per-
mitting local populations to petition Constantinople as ultimate
arbiter.
It was a strategic concession with ambiguous benefits because, to
adapt Gellner's metaphor, the sheepdogs were also wolves. In
Cyprus as is described for other parts of the Ottoman empire, 'the
scribal class [...] was implicated in the deliberate obfuscation of fiscal
records, this being the simplest and most effective means by which
the powerful could arrange to have their temporary holdings illegally
converted into something resembling absolute property, or into per-
manent pious estates with themselves as beneficiaries' (McGowan
ibid.: 58). Whilst the governor required the Church machinery to
collect taxes, the latter clearly benefited from the arrangement. It
could appeal to Constantinople on behalf of its flock to restrict a
governor's rapacity, or inversely to safeguard its own resources from
peasant depredations. The fulcrum of this configuration were the
peasantry, overtaxed and often, together with the monasteries, preyed
upon by the military whose pay was frequently in arrears and whose
loyalties to the Governor were uncertain. Numerous accounts refer
to the overtaxed condition of the peasantry, paralleled in other parts
of the Empire.
The eighteenth century Greek Cypriot historian, Cyprianos, per-
ceptively interpreted the allocation of responsibility for the collection
of (Greek) taxes to the Church in political terms: 'the Porte, wishing
to curb in some degree the rapacity of the authorities, to save the
rayah from perishing [...] and to inspire some little hope into the
poor creatures still left, probably thought it politic to recognise the
Archbishop of Cyprus [...] with his three suffragans, as guardians, in
a way, and representative of the rayah' (Excerpta, op. cit.: 353). The
Church's relationship to secular authorities and the inhabitants it
represented was radically transformed. With respect to the former
their position was strengthened; the Archbishops 'often appeared
boldly in person before the Grand Vezir, stating their complaints
and asking for a diminution of the taxes paid by the rayah'. In
restricting the rapacity of lower level officials the Church could be
very successful.
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For example, a long-standing case involved a sipahi from Lefka village and Kyk-
kos Monastery was settled to the Church's favour in 1786. The sipahi had insisted
on grazing his animals in the Monastery's pasture lands and the Monastery finally
petitioned Constantinople. The petition stated that the sipahi had threatened :
'give to me for the grazing of your animals in these grazing grounds a sum of aspra.
If you do not give them to me, by God, I shall impose upon you another tax by title
deed' (Othom. Engraf.; Doc 13, p. 230), by which he meant that should the monks
not accede to his request he would have falsified records to show that they had more
land under cultivation and thus liable to even higher taxes. This was a standard
method utilised by sipahis (whose ziamet allocations had been reduced) to extract
more income.
More circumspection was required in dealing with the Governor.
The relationship can best be described as an uneasy alliance. Mariti,
who resided in Cyprus for 20 years, noted that 'the poor subjects
might very often be saved from oppression if their Archbishops were
not from policy, and sometimes personal interest, ready to lend
themselves to the exactions of the Muhassil, so that they are often
abandoned by the very person who ought to take their part' (1769 :
10).
Initially the task of tax evaluation was assumed by the Dragoman
or Greek interpreter in the Government palace. His functions were
'to take a census of the inhabitants with a valuation of their property,
to assign the amount of tax payable by each, to draw a budget for
each year [...] and having the right of direct access to the Sultan
which made him a veritable thorn in the flesh of the Turkish Governor'
(Hill, ibid. : 17). The Dragoman was usually chosen by the Bishops
or notables (Hill, ibid. : 16), most had been educated in the monas-
teries and some could trace close affinal or kinship links to highly
placed Churchmen (Excerpta, op. cit. : 369), a very powerful combina-
tion. In 1792 it was observed that the Dragoman 'has entire power
over the Governor who cannot read and must perforce believe what
the Dragoman tells him' (Excerpta, op. cit. : 369). By 1806 he had
become 'the most powerful, as well as probably the wealthiest, person
in Cyprus' (Hill, ibid. : 104) (2). The rise of Dragoman power was
resented by the military garrison which, together with the Turkish
civilian population, rose in revolt in 1804. The objects of their
attack 'were not their immediate officers so much as the Muhassil
(2) Perhaps nothing brings out more force- By 1804 the portrait of Dragoman Hadji
fully their rise in stature and importance, Georgiakis Kornesios is done in secular
as well as their religious origins, than their European style, the religious iconography
portraits. That of Dragoman Haji Joseph has disappeared. There is one figure of
in 1776 is an icon showing a diminutive the Dragoman who is holding a diploma
figure with his family surrounded by the with the Sultan's cipher (Hill : pi. V, vr).
Panayia in an almost cosy domestic scene.
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and the Archbishop and Dragoman, who were suspected, perhaps
justifiably, of acting in concert with him' (Hill, ibid. : 104). The
immediate cause of the revolt was a rumour of the shortage of food-
stuffs, possibly due to corn being illegally exported (see below).
The Dragoman escaped the attack on his house, hid in the house
of a friendly Turkish family, and reported to Constantinople. The
Bishops then borrowed 30,000 piastres from the European Consuls
to ship troops to Cyprus and restore order (Hill, ibid. : 106-7).
As the Church had become a political institution, the prizes for
incumbents of the Archbishopric increased, although they ultimately
cost high Churchmen their lives in 1821. Intrigue within the Church
was common, bidding for the post became established practice, the
customary douceur for appointment being 100,000 aspers (Excerpta,
op. cit. : 470), and it is possible that factions developed linking highly
placed Churchmen and Turks over appointments as occurred in
Mainland Greece (Clogg 1976 : 21-2). By 1814 the Archbishop had
usurped the authority of the Dragoman, with whom conflict had
emerged; 'from the humblest situation of an obscure deacon he raised
himself, by extraordinary means, to the episcopacy : he borrowed
immense sums of money from the rich, which he lavished on the
poor; securing in this manner the votes of his creditors, that they
might be repaid, and those of others in expectation of future reward'
(Kinnier, Excerpta, op. cit. : 416). The Church then assessed each
village's share of the taxes which it collected through its grammatikoi
(clerks) and monks (Jenness 1962 : 58). Some of the former entered
trade (Jenness 1962 : 59).
The indispensibility of a scribal group entrusted with the assess-
ment and collection of taxes depends partly, but not exclusively,
upon its ability to maintain its monopoly of local knowledge. In
1806 a perceptive traveller, Don Domingo Badie y Leblich ('Ali Bey'),
noted that :
these princes of the Church receive the imposts assessed on the community so as
to pay to the Turkish government its annual claim, and to share with it a kind of
monopoly. The Government has never succeeded in learning how many Greeks
there are on the island. They own to a total of 32,000 souls : but well-informed
persons raise this number to a 100,000. Last year a commissioner was sent to
make an exact enumeration of the Greek families, but he was 'got at', loaded with
gold, and went away—his task unfulfilled. This handling of the taxes brings
enormous gains to the spiritual heads of the people, who suffer in silence lest a
worse evil befall them (Excerpta, op. cit. : 396).
The enormous gains Ali Bey refers to were not solely in crude cash
for the Church acquired large properties. Figures for the total
amount of and held by the Church during any period of Turkish
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rule are unavailable but they may be calculated with some certainty.
By 1909 the Church (sees, monasteries, churches) owned a total of
222,296 Donums (29565.3 hectares) or 5.3 % of total agricultural land
(Christodoulou 1959 : 74). Yet the area of land under cultivation
had been increasing during the latter nineteenth century, due to a
rise in population and less onerous taxation. In the seventeenth,
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the total area under cul-
tivation was much lower. In 1844 the French Consul estimated the
area under crops as 61,300 hectares, and the total amount of farm
land, reckoning a one to three year fallow, at some 180,000 hectares,
or about one-fifth of the island's land surface (Jenness, ibid. : 65).
As the Church's holdings have remained static since then, they must
thus have amounted to 16.4 % of the total agricultural land in 1844.
Together with Evkaf and large estates (chiftliks), which likewise
remained static since the latter nineteenth century, all large estates
therefore amounted to 23.3 % of total agricultural land in 1844.
In earlier periods, with lower population and a smaller cultivable land
area, the percentage must have been much higher (3).
Parallel processes occurred in other Ottoman-ruled Greek islands;
in Mykonos 'le clerge grec figurait en 1620 parmi les plus grands
proprietaries. Le recensement turc de 1670 montre que dans les
six lies de l'ancien duche de Naxos, la richesse du clerge grec etait
encore plus marquee' (Slot 1982 : 107). The church acquired prop-
erties in three ways : (i) through the transfer of many properties
held by the Catholic Church in Venetian times, (ii) through bequests,
(iii) through the transfer of land by peasants to escape usurpation by
Ottoman officials. Christodoulou has suggested that 'some of the
property of the Latin Church passed to Moslem religious institutions,
but some may have found its way back to the Greek Orthodox Church.
The Ottoman Government showed respect to the Orthodox Church
whose property was as privileged as the Vaqf property' {ibid. : 72) (4).
(3) Kykkos monastery also possessed hold- have been trade given the monk's previous
ings in European and Asiatic Turkey, even occupation.
in Tiflis in the Causascus (Jenness, ibid. : (4) Indeed the Ottomans regarded Church
58 n. 2), though how it acquired these is property as vaqf. The Imperial Berat issued
unclear. Luke (1921 : 185-191) gives details in 1866, Section XX, specified that: 'All the
on a correspondence between the British waqf possessions of the churches which are
Consul at Beirut and the Patriarch of An- under the Archbishop's jurisdiction, vine-
tioch over a Cephalonian captain who be- yards, gardens, farms, fields, pastures,
came a Monk at Kykkos and was sent by the farms, holy wells, mills, flocks, and other
Abbot on 'several journeys into Asia on the ecclesiastical property, are entirely under
business of the convent and later transferred the lordship and control of the said Arch-
to Tripoli in Syria to watch over its interests bishop, and no one may interfere with
in those parts' (p. 186). The nature of them' (Excerpta : 472).
this business is unknown but it may well
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By the early seventeenth century 'Christians redeemed nearly all the
monasteries from those who had seized them, and much of the Church
land as well. Churchmen of position left money for masses for the
repose of their souls, or bestowed it by way of gifts' (Excerpta, op. cit. :
350). A more disparaging account from 1815 noted that the priests
'strip the poor ignorant superstitious peasant of his last para, and
when he is on his deathbed, make him leave his all to their convent,
promising that masses shall be said for his soul' (Excerpta, op. cit. :
449). These legal privileges were recognized in the Imperial Berats;
Christians could leave up to one-third of their properties to the
Church which could be 'exacted from the heirs through a court' (Excer-
pta, op. cit. : 473).
Apart from indubitable religious sentiments, practical reasons
motivated peasants to donate their lands. Population decline in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the flight of many from the
land, and heavy taxes concentrated properties under the control of
the monasteries which, consisting solely of producers, could more
easily pay taxes than large peasant families. Furthermore, the
reduction of sipahi incomes and the lack of central control encouraged
brigandage and the forceful eviction of peasants from their holdings
to create illegal chiftliks (large estates). Many chiftliks were eventually
transformed into vaqf or habous, pious foundation land which could
not be sold, alienated or sequestrated. These estates produced
cotton and corn and a thriving illegal trade in the latter developed.
Christodoulou notes that 'both the Greek Orthodox Church and
Evqaf amassed large properties from donations. The Church received
donations from pious people but received also grants from people
who feared the envy of officials and usurpation. Once the properties
passed into the name of the Church or monastery they were safe.
The Evqaf received large donations from the Royal Family, from
wealthy landowners and from people who feared usurpation or feared
that their heirs might dissipate the property' (ibid. : 72).
Although land granted to the Church was still subject to taxation
(especially tithes), as was vaqf, it was protected from usurpation.
It is a striking fact that many of the large Church holdings were
located close to chiftliks indicating that the processes were parallel
(see map). Transfer merely required the oral depositions of two
Greek witnesses. The original owner would farm the land during
his lifetime but it would eventually be claimed by the Monastery.
Thus, paradoxically, the very process which led to the creation of
vaqf and chiftliks by the dispossession of peasants resulted in the
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involved in conflicts with heirs. A mass of documents at Kykkos
monastery records the, mostly successful, petitions by the Abbots
and monks to Constantinople to enjoy the uninterrupted use of their
lands (Othotn. Engraf., op. cit. : 1973). One typical case (Doc. 24,
p. 145) in 1815 forbade the intervention of the heirs into the wills
drawn up by Greeks who had donated their land to the 'Patriarchs,
monks, churches and monasteries. These [wills] have absolute force
insofar as they are in accordance with the depositions of Greek
witnesses and the commands of Holy Law'. The judgement con-
cluded : 'You are to forbid the high-handed acts of the heirs of those
who bequeathed land'.
Other documents indicate that churchmen were as equally liable
to appeal against the actions of the Greek subjects they were supposed
to protect, as against Ottoman officials. Kykkos Monastery was contin-
ually involved in litigations with various villages; thus in 1780 'some
Christians (people were identified by their religion not their ethni-
city) named Helen and [...] inhabitants of Milikouriou, Tsakistras and
Kampou set foot into the landed property and vineyards, snatched
and plundered objects and furniture to the value of 200 grosha'
(Doc. 18, ibid. : p. 127). The judgement was cautious and the cadi
was ordered to 'examine the case on the spot (epi topos), and to be
frank and lenient', possibly because the case may have involved some
clerical peccadillo. Grazing rights were a continual source of fric-
tion. In 1786 the inhabitants of Pentayias, Elias and Aspromeriti
claimed rights to grazing grounds also claimed by the Monastery
'in opposition to Ancient Law, claiming : "We also shall henceforth
graze our animals with you"' (Doc. 19, p. 129). As the appeals were
lodged by the Monastery, which were judged by the Sultan or Vazir
after consultation with the tax register (a matter in which the Church
could had influence), and finally as privileges ab antiquo could easily
be claimed but hardly be substantiated, it is not surprising that most
judgments favoured the Church.
There is scant evidence on the sentiments of ordinary folk,
but Cyprianos, a Churchman writing in 1788, complained that
his misguided countrymen blamed the Church for their misfor-
tunes :
The people had an evil habit of not ascribing their misfortunes to the proper source,
nor the increase of their debts to the insatiate and heartless greed of the governors,
but thoughtlessly laid the blame on their spiritual fathers and chiefs : and this
not only now, but from old [...] Many refuse to lend a helping hand to those whose
love had prompted them to risk their lives for their compatriots (Excerpta, op. cit. :
365).
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By 1806, at the height of their power, churchmen were afforded a
good deal of public respect :
The Greeks are extremely submissive and respectful towards their bishops : in
saluting them they bow low, take off their cap, and hold it before them upside
down. They scarcely dare speak in their presence. It is true that for this com-
munity of slaves the bishops are rallying points. It is through them that it preserves
some kind of existence, that it suits the people to give their prelates political impor-
tance, such as even the Turks allow them, judging by the deferential and respectful
manner which they observe towards the bishops. These, on their part, parade
in their houses and followers a princely luxury; they never go out without a crowd
of attendants, and to ascend a flight of stairs they must need be carried by their
servants (Excerpta, op. cit. : 396).
The Church was also involved in trade. Mouzelis (1978 : 159) has
argued that the 'formalistic and secular character of the Greek Ortho-
dox Church was relevant to the development of Greek Commerce'.
In 1745 it was observed that the bishops 'move from place to place
as traders' (Drummond : 280), and Kykkos Monastery possessed
camels, the main beast of heavy transport for traders (Othom. Engraf.).
By 1814 Kinneir observed that :
The Governor and Archbishop deal more largely in corn than all the other people
of the island put together; they frequently seize upon the whole yearly produce,
at their own valuation, and either export or retail at an advanced price; nay it hap-
pened more than once during the war in Spain, that the whole of the corn was
purchased in this manner by the merchants of Malta, and exported without leaving
the lower orders a morsel of bread {Excerpta, op. cit. : 414).
It is hard to disagree with Hill that 'whatever view we take of
the responsibility of the Bishops, there is no disguising the fact that
the amount extorted from the island must have risen by something
like 50 %' (ibid. : 101). Such concentration of power provoked the
inevitable resentment of local Governors. The Greek war of Inde-
pendence (1821-8) provided the pretext for the brutal massacre of
the Church hierarchy. The massacre had three effects. First, the
enosis ideal, which appears to have been practically non-existent prior
to 1821, emerged partly but not exclusively as a result of the bloodshed.
Henceforth security from Ottoman rapacity was to be increasingly
sought in a union with Greece. Second, Churchmen became martyrs
for a political cause for which they originally had ambivalent feelings.
It is widely accepted that the Archbishop and Churchmen in Cyprus
were not prepared to do more than give financial support to the Phi-
like Heteria in Greece; nor had they planned any insurrection (Kou-
moulides 1971; Mitsidou 1971). The massacre had its origins in
the contradictions of an outpost of the Ottoman empire which had
permitted an uneasy dyarchy between Governors and Churchmen.
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The 1821 events itself generated the belief that justice in an Ottoman
world was impossible, and it legitimated the ideal that this could
only be pursued through some form of union with a liberated Greece.
The symbolism of a religious martyrdom in the pursuit of an ideal
and the martyrdom of religious men exercised a strong hold on popular
imagination and was to be adroitly exploited by Makarios.
A final effect of the 1821 events was the political emergence of
the European consuls stationed on the island, and the entrusting of
tax-farming to lay Greek-Cypriots, who engaged in the interstices
of trade left by the former or who often worked with them. During
the late seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries a new elite had
emerged open to new European ideas and influences and they rapidly
filled the economic vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Church
from tax-farming and trade. The Church never recovered its eco-
nomic dominance following the 1821 events, but it achieved an added
political identity and dimension which was to influence the aspirations
of the new elites.
Production and trade : development of Ottoman chiftliks
and Greek mercantilism
Ottoman prebendalism was 'inherently contemptuous of bourgeois-
commercial utilitarianism' (Weber), and subject Christians and Jews
rapidly filled such niches, initially in conjunction with European
traders and eventually independently.
European interest in the Levant trade initially centred on cotton
and silk; later wheat, wool and hides were in high demand (McGowan,
ibid.). Consulates were established in Aleppo with satellite establish-
ments in Cyprus (Luke, ibid.). Most of this trade was shared by
English, French and Dutch merchants. In 1735 the three main
exports from Cyprus were Wine, Silk and Cotton (Jenness, ibid.).
By the end of the eighteenth century, production of cotton declined,
hastened by the new and rising European demand for wheat in which
a thriving illegal exportation developed. By 1815 it was reported
that Cyprus could export enough corn to load sixty or seventy vessels;
in good years it shipped as much as 300 or 350,000 bushels of wheat
to Europe and Turkey. In 1875 648,000 bushels were exported to
England, Belgium and France (Jenness 1962 : 69).
Trade in primary products, uneven though it was, had two
consequences. First it led to the appropriation of peasant holdings
by Ottoman officials and their concentration into large estates, chiftliks
15
PAUL SANT CASSIA
producing for external markets. Second, an ethnic and complemen-
tary division of labour emerged as Greek Cypriots attached to Euro-
pean Consulates entered the mercantile middleman business and
eventually tax-farming.
McGowan has suggested that at least three elements were involved
in chiftlik formation : (i) a sudden and compelling commercial motive,
(ii) wholesale collaboration by agents of the State, (iii) the participation
of townsmen of means in the process {ibid. : 60). The process
parallels latifundia creation in Sicily (Blok 1974) where robber barons
forced peasants off their lands and into agrotowns. One difference
was that as Ottoman territories theoretically belonged to the Sultan,
connivance by officials, scribes, etc., was necessary to create private
property usually disguised as vaqf (pious estates). Dispossession was
of two types : by force, the use of armed men or bandits and included
'voluntary abandonment because of intolerable conditions' (McGowan,
ibid. : 65). Banditry was the physical armature of this process. The
effects were neither short-term nor circumscribed. Withdrawal of
prebends, reduction of sipahi incomes, retarded pay led to more
pillaging and usurpation; hence larger chiftliks, and a greater demand
for Church 'protection'. Production in the small peasant sector
plummeted and grew in the large-estate sector. Another was titular
dispossession, more common in Cyprus where labour power was
scarce; this 'left the cultivator in place but generally imposed new
and harsher conditions upon him' (McGowan, ibid. : 66), mainly
but not exclusively due to the debt cycle. Leake, who travelled in
Northern Greece in 1835, noted that the process had the following
steps : high taxation, leading to borrowing at usurious interest rates,
inability to pay both taxes, loans and interest, and finally sales
of whole villages to high officials for relief (Clogg, ibid.; 1976 :
11).
Chiftliks were a conqueror's type of farming (Braudel 1973 :
725); concentrated in the well-watered lowlands they produced cotton
and cereals for the market. In Cyprus they 'have almost invariably
a perennial source of water; in some cases they have the best land
in the area' (Christodoulou, ibid. : 76). Chiftlik owners were called
'dragons of the water' because they were granted water rights :
'Imperial Firmans conferred large water rights on favourite persons
or groups. All the rivers of Cyprus which have ample supplies of
water, especially a summer flow, have been so allocated : Kouris,
Dhiarrizos, Ezuza, Khrysokhou, Solia, Marathasa; in the case of the
first four all the water was given to private individuals' (Christodou-
lou, ibid. : 89), i.e. Ottomans. The last two were given to the Church.
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Apart from these transformations of the previous prebendal system,
many chiftliks emerged in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Exact figures are unavailable but in the Paphos district, for example, 3
chiftliks out of 4, amounting to 8,982 donums or 76 % of the total
Paphos chiftlik area, date from this period. Most of these new
chiftliks were concentrated in the Paphos and Larnaca lowlands, had
a perennial source of water, and were close to the main ports. They
were created mainly by usurpation, such as seizure, occupying land
abandoned due to flight, overtaxation and debt, or by receiving land
from villagers in return from tax collectors (often one and the same
person), or finally in return for relief from deliberate terror and
harassment (McGowan, ibid. : 136). The last was a favourite tactic
as shown by numerous village petitions (5), and was still being prac-
ticed in 1806 when Ali Bey noted that : 'property is only respected
when the owner is stronger or better protected than the spoiler. One
frequently sees a wretched Greek villager ousted by a Turk who
enters into possession of his patrimony. To avoid these odious
vexations many natives place themselves under the protection of
some European consul, who is allowed to grant this favour to a
certain number' (Excerpta, op. cit. : 397).
According to the 1909-29 General Survey of Properties, 69,210 do-
nums were registered as chiftliks, making 1.6% of the then total
agricultural land. As these did not include the original prebendal
domains, the total area must have been higher during the Ottoman
period ; Christodoulou notes that 'dissolution and subdivision has
been going on for decades if not centuries' (ibid. : 76). In addition
many lands registered as vaqf (24,826 donums) were in reality disguised
private property. In 1878 it was noted that the Evqaf registers
were in a neglected state and 'all interests and wants were subordinated
to the greed of the Ministry of Evqaf, at Stamboul, and the grasping
wants of trustees' (Seager, quoted in Christodoulou, ibid. : 75). As
private property had been legally recognized after the 1839-56 Tan-
zitnat reforms, it would be reasonable to expect that some vaqf found
its way into private ownership and administration. Finally the area
under cultivation was much less due to a lower population, probably
180,000 hectares including fallow (Jenness, ibid. : 65), giving a
definite 7 % and a probable 10 to 15 % of the total agricultural land.
A second consequence of trade with Europe was the emergence of
many Greek Cypriots who entered the middleman business, attaching
themselves to European Consulates as agents, interpreters and mid-
(5) Othoman, Engraf : 1973, p. 113.
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dlemen. Various privileges were attached to these posts such as
exemption from taxes. As Braude and Lewis point out, this warrant
'had the effect of removing its recipient from the status of a dhimmi
to something approaching the status of a resident foreigner' {ibid. :
28). Many eventually entered trade, especially in the ports of the
Middle East dealing in goods such as carobs, timber, etc., in which
Europeans showed scant interest. By the late seventeenth century
it was reported that 'there are rich and influential individuals among
the Greek Cypriots, but not being allowed to carry weapons they
devote themselves to trade. They carry oil, cheese, and other goods
to Tripoli and other ports in Syria, but do not make long voyages'
(Jenness, ibid. : 59, quoting Mas Latrie : i n , 586). By 1807 Cypriot
merchants had established thriving businesses in Syria (6) and Li-
massol (7), even attempting to separate themselves from the Consulates
to whom they were attached (Luke, ibid. : 146). By the beginning
of the nineteenth century only one English merchant remained in
Cyprus who 'had to contend with the united phalanx of Levantines,
who had no inclination to admit a competitor in trade [...] Much of
the trade is contraband, particularly corn; and it is necessary to keep
on good terms with the aga and officers employed at the custom-
house by presents, the best and only means of ensuring favour in
any competition with Levantines' (Excerpta, op. cit. : 420). After 1821
many Cypriots, who had adopted European lifestyles (8), assumed Greek
nationality in order not to pay taxes and entered trade as well as for
protection (9), a practice which troubled Ottoman authorities (10).
Not surprisingly such men were well-placed to enter the tax-
farming business after it was removed from the Church's control.
Tax-farming, credit and marketing reinforced each other; that such
business was lucrative is demonstrated by their opposition to attempted
tax-reforms in the late nineteenth century (11). In 1878 there were
numerous reports of a debt-ridden peasantry (12) which assumed
alarming proportions by the early twentieth century.
The first stirrings of Greek nationalism date from this period.
The connection between the rise of mercantilism and nationalism
has been noted in many parts of the Mediterranean (Schneider and
Schneider 1976; Hansen 1977). Mercantile elite formation in Cyprus
parallels similar processes in Sicily and Catalonia. In all three cases
local groups could maintain and reproduce themselves either by
(6) Luke, ibid. : 137-8. (10) Luke, ibid. : 169.
(7) Excerpta : 392. (11) Luke, ibid. : 203.
(8) Excerpta : 405. (12) Luke, ibid. : 229.
(9) Luke, ibid. : 166-7.
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creating their own power domains which resisted the expansion of
the Modern State (as the Mafia did in Sicily), or by monopolising
access to local resources and the circulation of essential commodities
and basic foodstuffs. Such activities required 'friendship coalitions'
dominated by landed and commercial interests, such as the Sicilian
Mafia and Graeco-Turkish interest groups. According to P. Schnei-
der, the friendship coalition is 'an outcome, and adaptation to a
basic structural problem typical of early mercantilist colonies' (1972 :
256), namely the organization of critical economic activities in the
countryside where State institutions are lacking. By contrast to
Northern Europe, the development of the State in the Southern and
Eastern Mediterranean did not precede, or proceed concurrently
with, the market. Rather, market forces penetrated the periphery
earlier than State institutions. Their particular characteristic was
that they did not provide the basis for a cohesive internal political
organization; by contrast, because of external economic links, they
eventually limited the expansion of State power by creating discrete
power domains possessing their own cultural codes for organization
such as the Mafia and omerta.
Ideologies (such as nationalism) and cultural codes can therefore
also be seen as idioms utilized to organize internal coalitions (Cohen
1974) and resist external threats. Yet the precise relationship be-
tween nationalist sentiments and mercantilism in Cyprus, as in Greece,
appears more ambiguous and has not been sufficiently explored.
Clogg has suggested that members of the Greek Philiki Etairia were
'overwhelmingly failed merchants or bankrupts, men who had failed
to make the grade in the fiercely competitive world of the Greek
mercantile diaspora [...] The established and wealthy Greek mer-
chants of the mercantile diaspora for the most part wanted nothing
to do with the society' (1976 : xvii). Certainly an 1831 letter by
'Greek Citizens' in Cyprus to the Consul of Russia complaining of
the withdrawal of their privileges as Greek nationals mentions 'certain
individuals whose interest lies in pandering to the boundless greed
of the Governors' (Luke, ibid. : 167), suggesting that there were wide
divergencies of opinion, sentiment and interest among the Cypriot
mercantile elite.
Interethnic relations
It is worthwhile to discuss relations between Greeks and Turks
during the Turkocratia because they assume an over-riding importance
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in the twentieth century and because they have been the subject of
confused debate.
It is well known that the Ottoman millet system administered
subject peoples according to their religious beliefs, rather than their
ethnicity. The boundaries of the two did not necessarily coincide,
religion being a qualitatively wider category in classifying people
than their ethnicity. It is an indication of the complexity of this
problem of definition that the categories of ethnicity, religious belief,
language, etc., have themselves changed across time according to
different usages. Yet we are talking about a period where ethnicity
was pre-nationalist, and where a shared language and a common
feeling for a distinct cultural past were probably considered to have
been less important in the creation of an ethnic identity than they
were to assume in the twentieth century. Indeed in this period of
highly restricted literacy, spoken Greek Cypriot was probably more
heavily admixtured with Turkish words than in this century.
Legal status, meaning religious status, is the key to understanding
relations between Greeks and Turks during this period. Whilst
both groups possessed 'natural' differences in language, dress, mar-
riage customs and geographical origins, differences in religious beliefs
and practices were critical. The two groups were fixed in a rela-
tionship according to an immutable law which specified their respec-
tive, and different, rights, duties and privileges. Evidently the
Divine Sharia favoured the Turks as the ruling group because they
were Muslim, but it would be a mistake to assume that the Greeks
viewed this as unnatural, at least prior to the end of the eighteenth
century. The Ottomans were initially welcomed because 'they hate
the Latins more than the Turks' and the Church certainly benefited
from its political responsibilities. Indeed it was commonly believed
in the Greek world that the Ottoman conquest of the Byzantine
Empire 'came about by Divine Providence as a punishment for the
Christian Empire's manifold sins and so that the Ottoman Empire
might act as a shield for the Orthodox Church against the taint of
the Latin heresy' (Clogg 1976 : xiii), and messianic oracles foretelling
liberation had much currency among the Greeks. Until the nine-
teenth century it was probably believed that if liberation were to
be obtained at all it would be through Divine intervention, rather than
through human effort.
This doctrine of ethelodouleia 'voluntary submission to the powers
that be, which the leaders of Millet-i Rum manifested with the Otto-
man authorities' (Clogg 1982 : 191), should be approached in terms
of Weber's sociology of motives : 'very frequently the "world images"
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that have been created by "ideas" have, like switchmen, determined
the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of
interest. "From what" and "for what" one wished to be redeemed
and, let us not forget "could be" redeemed, depended upon one's
image of the world' (1970 : 280).
From the perspective of the Ottomans, religious practice defined
membership of a particular group and legal status; they jealously
guarded their outward signs of privilege. The Greeks for their part
laboured under too many ascribed legal liabilities to construct an
ethnic identity in the modern sense as based upon language, etc.
Indeed in a pre-industrial age of restricted literacy (and even linguistic
camouflaging) these components were either unusable or could
hardly be perceived as the 'natural' basis of this identity. Rather,
Greek ethnic identity was formed mainly through the Church and
the family, in short through religious ritual practices and the ritual
of social relations. The fact that both Greeks and Turks had pro-
phetic religions with exclusive claims to Divine Truth undoubtedly
fixed the boundaries of both groups but did not prevent movement
upwards.
Apart from joining the Church hierarchy (which could be expen-
sive), or consular attachment (which required literacy usually in
Turkish and European languages rather than necessarily Greek),
three main means of social mobility were available to ordinary Greeks :
through (i) religious conversion, (ii) intermarriage, and (iii) through
adopting the customs, dress, deportment, language of the ruling
class. Religious conversion had the greatest advantages for the poor :
lower taxes and greater protection in the courts. It was particularly
common in times of war between Turks and Christians during which
religious tensions rose (Vryonis 1975). Analytically two types of
conversion should be distinguished. First, complete apostasy (mean-
ing the adoption of Islam, Turkish names, etc.) was usually consoli-
dated by marriage with the ruling dominant groups and resulted in
complete absorption over a number of generations (Karpat 1982 :
147). Because of its nature it was an individual strategy, probably
an urban phenomenon, and certainly determined by the accessibility
of safe legal redress. Indeed, 'Muslim society was at all times
accessible by religious conversion and conversion was usually wel-
comed. Absorption is the most immediately apparent among the
Christian aristocracies of Asia Minor and the Balkans' (Vryonis,
ibid. : 146).
The second type of conversion was crypto-Christianity, i.e. the
public adoption of Islamic practices whilst following Christian rites
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in the secrecy and privacy of the home. Such converts were known
as linovamvakoi (half linen, half cotton) and were well established
until the early twentieth century (Luke, ibid.). This type of apostasy
seems to have been collective and whole villages were involved.
Most of the words used to describe this common phenomenon in
many parts of the Ottoman empire 'reflect ambivalence, though in
some cases they are geographical in nature' (Vryonis, ibid. : 145).
We know little of the conditions which led to it, though distance
from administrative centres as well as resident sipahis may have
been critical. As it was often collective and ambiguous, absorption
was minimal; certainly collective complicity and village endogamy
probably limited the effectiveness of marriage as a means of social
mobility as in the first type. It was motivated by a desire to mitigate
the effects of taxation, etc., rather than as a means of social mobility.
Absorption was quicker when religious conversion was combined
with intermarriage. There is little information on the latter's extent
but the nature of the exchange seems clear : Greek women (rather
than Greek men) moved upwards through marriage or concubinage
with Turks. Religious, economic, and legal reasons encouraged
this flow. Similar processes occurred in other Greek islands such
as Naxos (Slot, ibid. : 107). In terms of religion, 'when one examines
Islamic and Christian law in matters of intermarriage, it would seem
that Islam was more elastic in both theoria and praxis' (Vryonis, ibid. :
142-3). Canon Law insisted on the Orthodoxy of both partners;
Islam permitted men to take non-Muslim wives so long as the male
progeny remained Muslim, whilst non-Muslim men could not take
Muslim wives. Islam was geared towards expansion through men's
marriages.
Different systems of property transmission undoubtedly aided this
process and contractual concubinage, known as Kepin, between
Muslim males and non-Muslim females, could relieve Christians of
the burden of the dowry. Women were 'free to return to the Chris-
tian community and re-marry at the end of the contractual period'
(Vryonis, ibid. : 143), and although it is doubtful to what extent
return to the Christian fold was possible, Mariti writing in 1769
says that 'the women are long-lived, and often re-marry when they
are already great-grandmothers' (1769 : 57)—women may have been
in short supply or the bonds of marriage were less permanent.
According to Vryonis, the practice 'was so prevalent that the Patriarchs
made repeated attempts to halt it. In the Ottoman period the
institution of Kepin enjoyed certain advantages in the eyes of the
poor Christians which helped offset its disadvantages. In Orthodox
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marriages the bride's father had to pay not only a dowry (which
remained in the bride's name), but also the trachoma or an outright
gift to the groom. But in giving his daughter to a Turk he was
freed from paying these ruinous sums and received, in addition, a
bride-price from the Turkish groom. The children of such a union
stayed, in general, with the father' {ibid. : 143) (13).
It is somewhat doubtful whether the system worked as smoothly
and efficiently. Although Greek men gave their daughters some
sort of dowry, little is known as to its type and value, and there have
been suggestions that until recently the groom among Greek Cypriots
supplied the house and furnishings (Loizos 1975; Surridge 1930)
although women certainly inherited. What seems fairly certain is
that among Turkish Cypriots 'the portion the wife brings her husband
is little or nothing' (Mariti 1769 : 57), the husband paying the bride-
price. The system thus favoured the movement of women rather
than men, for a Greek Christian desiring a Muslim wife would not
only forfeit a (Greek) dowry, but had to adopt Islam and pay bride-
price.
By the mid-eighteenth century it was observed that 'Mahometan
men very often marry with the Christian women, and keep the fasts
with their wives' (Excerpta : 269) (14). But interethnic marriage
and especially concubinage could cause conflict where women were
secluded and honour values highly prized. Many villages have
myths linking the two communities in conflicts over women, especially
over Turk capture of Greek brides. There are two references to
religious conversion in the nineteenth century. In 1815 it was
observed that : 'many professed Moslems are in secret Greeks, and
observe all the numerous fasts of that church. All drink wine freely,
and many of them eat pork without scruple in secret, a thing unheard
of in Turkey. They frequently marry the Greek women of the
island, as their religion permits a Turkish man to marry an infidel
woman, though to guard against an abandonment of Mahometanism,
it forbids a Turkish woman to marry an infidel' (Excerpta : 447).
By 1867 a considerable number of converts to Islam were recorded :
The clause engaging that the free exercise of his religion [a reference to the Tan-
zimat reforms] shall be permitted to every one is also far from being carried out.
There exist here scattered throughout the island some 5,100 persons who are Mus-
sulmans in name only, some of whom apostatized from Christianity in order to
save their lives during the Greek Revolution, when a reign of terror prevailed here,
(13) The institution of Kepin was partic- (14) The 'fasts' could equally have been




while others are the offspring of the illicit amours of Greeks and Mussulmans, who
are always forced to adopt the religion of the dominant race. Some of the latter
are bona-fide Mussulmans, but a great many are Christians at heart, but are obliged
publicly to acknowledge the Prophet, and can only secretly testify their adherence
to Christianity. There can be no doubt that, if there was perfect toleration in
religion, these persons would gladly emancipate themselves from the thraldom of
their position. Report of the English Vice-Consul (Luke, ibid. : 222-223).
'Illicit' these 'amours' certainly were—from the perspective of the
Orthodox Church though not according to Muslim law. Indeed
initially many Christians resorted to Muslim Kadi courts 'to escape
the more rigid stipulations of their own religious law in such matters
as marriage, divorce, and parenthood rights [...] In the eighteenth
century the Greek patriarchate had to take serious measures to prevent
the latter practice, as a result of which the infiltration of Islamic
and customary law was being seen in such areas as marriage and
dowry practices' (Inalcik 1982 : 437). As Gellner has observed :
'clerisies in agro-literate societies cannot properly dominate and
absorb the entire society' (1983 : 17). Once their powers were rein-
forced the Bishops could apply sanctions equally against marriages
within the prohibited degrees of kinship, as against those who married
outside the faith, including the denial of a religious burial (Excerpta :
473)-
In addition, ethnic differences tended to become obscured through
Greek adoption of the customs, dress, and language of the Turks
further up the social hierarchy (Excerpta : 268). As the Ottomans
considered it beneath them to learn the language of a subject people
many Greeks learned Turkish. Inevitably to distance themselves the
Turks relied on their legal privileges : 'The Turks are so jealous
of the power of Christians here that they will not suffer them to
buy any black slaves or others that are Mahometans, which former
are frequently brought to Egypt and sold to the Turks' (Excerpta :
269).
Not surprisingly with the growth of Greek economic power,
collective action by ethnic groups qua ethnic groupes was exclusively
Turkish aimed at preserving their privileges. For example, in legal
conflicts between Muslims and Christians legal evidence was weighted
in theory against the latter. In practice Turkish privileges were
eroded (15).
(15) All the members (of the courts) are lie are materially mitigated by the important
open to bribery, and the rich Christian circumstance that they are the wealthiest
suitor is often more than a match for his class in the island, being the principal land-
poor Mussulman adversary. The civil owners, and, in trade no less than in agri-
disabilities, too, under which the Christians culture, possess a pre-eminence over the
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There are no cases of Greeks acting as a group. Even Turkish
action is limited to military rebellions against central authority and,
in 1804, to an insurrection protesting the influence of the Greek
Dragoman (but not directed against the Greeks). Indeed the major
social distinction is between urbanites and countrymen, and Archiman-
drite Cyprianos expresses no surprise at collective mob action by
Greeks and Turks protesting a rise in taxes in 1764 as a result of
which the Governor was killed and his palace ransacked.
Conclusion
As in the other parts of the Mediterranean in the pre-nationalist
period (e.g. the Maghreb), the only social group with a cultural
policy, i.e. the clerisy, could not totally dominate the entire society
insofar as matrimonial and religious practices were concerned. Duby
and Goody (1983) have also shown that in Northern Europe matri-
monial practices often departed significantly from Church dogma,
whilst in the Maghreb the traditional disdain Moroccan Ulama
reserved for tribesmen was as much due to religious reasons as class
ones. In all cases the critical feature which determined the Church's
or clerisy's response to such heterodoxy was primarily the nature of
its relationship to the governing elite. In Cyprus, as in other parts
of South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East during the Ottoman
period, religious camouflaging and matrimonial unorthodoxy often
went together partly because of the ambiguous interstitial position
of the Church, the relative elasticity of Islam on matrimonial matters
(in comparison to Christianity), and finally because of the comple-
mentarity of two different property transmission systems. Relations
between the Church hierarchy and its grass roots, already strained
by its tax collecting role, were further exacerbated by unorthodox
religious and matrimonial practices which the Church attempted to
stop. Similar processes occurred in Lesbos (Papataxiarchis 1985)
and other Ottoman controlled Christian lands. The major social
cleavages in Cyprus were intraethnic rather than interethnic.
Mahomedans. Enjoying thus the many ad- of living. In such cases it may truly be
vantages which accrue from the possession said that the Christians get justice for them-
of superior wealth [...] they are not infre- selves, and in spite of the spirit of the
quently able to induce the local councils to institutions provided for that purpose by
accept their evidence against Mahomedans. Government' (Report of Vice Consul in
This is especially the case in places where Cyprus, 1867; quoted in Luke, 1921 : 219-
the latter are few and poor, and dependent, 220).
it may be, on the Christians for their means
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Finally in the post-Ottoman nationalist period, Greek-Cypriot
historiography, heavily influenced by the Church's role in education,
has presented the Turkocratia as a period of religious persecution
(Mitsidou 1971; Persianis 1978) as well as emphasizing the Church's
role in keeping alight the flame of Hellenism. To what extent was
this correct ? The question is of more than academic interest for
the way how the past was viewed decisively influenced subsequent
relations between the two communities.
There is no doubt that Cyprus suffered serious decline during
the Ottoman period. Governors were appointed for short periods
and were more interested in extracting as much revenue as possible
to make their bid pay. There was no investment in the infrastructure
and the Island was probably in a worse state in 1878 than when the
Turks captured it from the Venetians. Greeks and increasingly
Turks were heavily taxed, and the settlement pattern of Greek villages
reflected the desire to be distant from the urban Ottoman-dominated
centres (Drury 1979). Violence was common, life insecure especially
for the Greeks. Yet this was not primarily a religious persecution;
indeed these conditions were common to most Ottoman-controlled
territories, Christian and Islamic. It was rather an attempt by a
ruling group to extract as much surplus as possible from a subject
agrarian population. Ottoman administration lacked a salaried scribal
class of functionaries and was obliged to rely on tax-farming. Oppres-
sion was arbitrary, discrete and individual, which probably contributed
to greater uncertainty. The late eighteenth century historian,
Cyprianos, called Cyprus an 'unhappy island' because in an uncertain
world justice could only be obtained by petitioning Constantinople
over the heads of local administrators, at great risk to the plaintiffs.
Clearly religion was used to justify oppression on the ground, as
it were, but it had no place in the Ottoman theory of the State
and Society, the Circle of Equity, as formulated in Constantino-
ple.
Due to the contradictions of Ottoman administration, the Greeks
were as likely to have been oppressed by their Churchmen as by the
Turks. Political recognition of the Orthodox Church offered ambig-
uous benefits to the Greeks. Yet because the Ottoman state operated
within an Islamic conceptual and legal framework which created the
millet system and gave it coherence and legitimacy, the specific nature
of Islam should not be overlooked. Entry to the ruling group
was possible through intermarriage, conversion, or recruitment for
specific State tasks, a common occurrence in the Ottoman world.
In contrast to later nationalistic periods, the relationship between
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religion and language was less clear-cut; there were Greek-speaking
Muslims in Anatolia, Cyprus, Crete, etc.
Religion was no impediment to collective mob action by urban
Greeks and Turks, and to the formation of factions linking highly
placed Greek and Ottoman officials. Yet in the countryside the
two communities lived largely separately; 'the norm was that of the
ethnically homogeneous village and, in the exceptions, heterogeneity
was usually achieved by residential separation rather than integration,
(Drury, ibid. : 3). The Greeks were pushed out of the most produc-
tive land to the mountains by 'the Turk who is always a friend of
plain and running waters' (Perrot 1864), the origin of Chiftliks, and
the largely residential separation in the countryside probably limited
contact between the two groups. Inevitably with the development
of commerce which the Greeks readily entered, exposure to new
European ideas, the growth of nationalism in Greece, and equally
significant, Turkish atrocities (especially in 1821 when the Governor,
through a ruse, massacred the Archbishop, his Bishops, monks and
Greek notables), the Greek Cypriot elite became more aware of their
legal disadvantages, and of the dangers to life and limb in a nation-
alistic world. Enosis promised them a dignity and security lacking
in Ottoman Cyprus (Loizos 1976). As on previous occasions they
turned to the Orthodox Church for leadership, and religion remained
a potent force, though with a modified significance, in relations
between Greeks and Turks in modern Cyprus *.
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Modern Greek Studies
Research Seminar at the University of Birmingham. I should like to thank Professor
A. Bryer and the participants for their helpful comments. Special thanks are also
due to Professor Gellner and Dr. P. Loizos for their valuable comments.
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